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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship
between corporate interest rates in the $Eurobond market and those of
equally risky corporate bonds in the domestic U.S. market.
As expected, the $Eurobond yield spreads are significantly less
than yield spreads on comparable bonds issued in the U.S. domestic
market. Hence, equally risky securities, denominated in the same cur-
rency, have been shown to trade at different prices in competing
markets
.
Such factors as taxes, anonymity, risk preferences and differing
regulations are presented as the major causes of the market segmenta-
tion. The findings support the belief that the SEuromarket is seg-
mented from the U.S. bond market.
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COMPARATIVE YIELD SPREADS ON U.S. AND ^EUROBONDS
The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship
between corporate interest rates in the $Eurobond market and those of
equally risky corporate bonds in the U.S. market. Prior work by Finnerty,
Schneeweis and Kegde [*+] examined the movement of $Eurobond rates relative
to U.S. bond indices. However, since Park's study [9], completed in 1 974
,
little research effort has been directed at examining or explaining the
relative structure of $Eurobond and U.S. bond rates.
The $Euromarket is by definition a long and a short term market, which
resides outside of the control or influence of any national monetary
authority. The $Eurocurrency market is the short-term segment of the
$Euromarket and the $Eurobond market is the long term fixed income segment.
$Surcbonds are those issued without restriction, outside the jurisdiction
of any single national authority, denominated in one of the major vehicle
currencies, and underwritten by an international syndicate. The major
issuers of $Eurobonds are multinational corporations, governments and
international organizations. A detailed discussion of the workings of the
$Eurobond market can be found in Fisher [5], Mendelsohn [7], and Park [93*
The presence of governmental policies and controls facilitated the
birth of the $Euromarket. However, once the market had become established,
the abolition or lifting of controls did not bring about the market's dem-
ise. In Table 1, the growth of the $Eurobond and U.S. corporate bond mar-
kets is compared. The relative growth of the ^Eurobond market has, in
large part, occurred since January 1 97^ when the Foreign Direct Investment
Regulations were abolished. Our study examines ^Eurobonds issued during
the "post controls" period, i.e., after January 1 97 1*
•
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Table 1
$Eurobonds and U.S. Corporate Bonds Issued During 1970-1983
^Eurobond U.S. Bonds ^Eurobond - Percent
Year Billions of $ Billions of $ of Total Debt Issues
1970 $2.0 $29 6.52
1971 3-3 37 8.2
1972 4.9 30 14.0
1973 3.0 24 11.1
1974 1.1 38 2.8
1975 4.8 50 8.8
1976 9.6 52 15.7
1977 11.2 48 18.9
1978 8.3 41 16.8
1979 10.4 49 17.5
1980 13.6 58 19.0
1981 21.5 49 30.5
1982 39.0 74 34.5
1983 34.9 68 33-9
This study is organized as follows. Section I contains a discussion
of differing market characteristics and their expected impact, and also
outlines the hypotheses to be examined. Section II provides a description
of the data and an explanation of the methodology. In Section III, (1)
yield spreads and (2) underwriting commissions for matched pairs of $Euro
and U.S. corporate bonds are analyzed. Section IV concludes with an over-
view of the findings.
Section I Yield Spread Relationships
Differing Market Characteristics and Their Expected Impact
"Free" markets are those in which there are no restraints on interna-
tional capital movements. Given free markets, the yields on Eurobonds and
domestic bonds denominated in the same currency and of equivalent risk
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should be identical. If this were not the case, borrowers would seek to
issue their bonds in the market with lower yields and investors would shift
their funds co the market with higher yields. Eventually, this shifting by
issuers and investors would cause the rates in both markets to be the same.
Hence, arbitrage would cause full integration of the two markets. Under
this pure arbitrage argument, equally risky securities, denominated in the
same currency, cannot be sold or traded at different prices in competing
markets. However, if effective arbitrage is hindered by differing risk
perceptions, tax-related barriers, liquidity differences, or regulatory
"red tape," the two markets would be segmented, and yields on equally risky
domestic bonds and Eurobonds would differ.
One potential inefficiency involves possible differences in the way
U.S. and ^Eurobond investors evaluate default risk. Investors in the U.S.
corporate bond market rely on detailed analyses of financial information to
measure default risk. In fact, investment bankers in the U.S. market gen-
erally require an issue to be rated as a condition of the offering. Alter-
natively, in the $Eurobond market, the general (a3 distinct from the finan-
cial) reputation of the borrowing corporation has been the primary risk
proxy [3> 53 and very few $Eurobond issues have been rated by Moody's or
Standard and Poor's. If $Eurobond investors evaluate default risk differ-
ently than U.S. investors, yields on equally risky bond3 may vary.
Tax-related barriers may also cause yields to dlTfer between the two
markets. U.S. corporate bonds are typically registered and are subject to
as much as a 30% withholding tax when coupons are cashed by nonresident
investors. By contrast, interest and principal payments on $Eurobonds are
exempt from withholding tax at the source. This does not exempt investors
from reporting income to their national authorities, but tax avoidance by
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legal means and tax evasion by illegal means are extremely widespread
(particularly outside the U.S.). While a large proportion of investment in
$Eurobonds is by non-U. S. central banks and government agencies and by
international financial institutions such as pension funds, insurance com-
panies, and investment banking firms [5, 7], estimates suggest that approx-
imately one-half of all $Eurobonds are held by individuals. The bulk of
these individual holdings are acquired anonymously through external
accounts, such as those administered by Swiss banks. [5, 7, 10] Tax eva-
sion is further facilitated by the fact that nearly all $Eurobonds are sold
in bearer form, providing no clue to the holder's identity. Hence,
$Eurobonds appear to have been "designed" fcr the tax evader, in marked
contrast to U.S. corporate bonds. For a non-resident tax evader,
$Eurobonds present advantages similar to those provided by tax-free munici-
pal bonds in the U.S. market. Just as municipal bond investors accept
lower yields than those available on taxable bonds of equal risk, non-resi-
dent tax evaders may accept lower yields on effectively "tax-free"
$Eurobonds.3
Relative market liquidity may also impact yields on equally risky U.S.
and $Eurobond issues. The $Eurobond market is thought to be considerably
less active and less liquid than the U.S. bend market. [5, 7] This may be
due, in part, to the mix of individual versus institutional investors in
each market. Individual investors are known to trade much less frequently
than their institutional counterparts. With individuals accounting for
approximately half of the trading volume in $Eurobonds [5, 7, 10] and less
than 1 0% in the U.S. bond market [6], the lesser liquidity of the $Eurobond
market is not surprising. Based on liquidity considerations, investors
would be expected to require higher yields on $Eurobonds than on equally
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risky U.S. bonds.
Another factor that may impact relative yields is the degree of regu-
lation in each market. The $Eurobond market is unregulated while the U.S.
market is highly regulated. Hence, ^Eurobond issues can be floated without
satisfying any S.E.C. requirements. The absence of S.E.C. restrictions and
requirements greatly reduces the time necessary to bring an issue to mar-
ket, to say nothing of the legal, accounting, and administrative costs that
are avoided. 1* U.S. borrowers may be willing to pay a yield premium to
avoid such regulatory constraints.
Test: Procedure
The first 3tep is to calculate yield spreads for both U.S. new issues
and $Eurobond new issues. The term "yield spread" is defined as the dif-
ference between the risk-free rate and the yield to maturity of a risky
security. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between yield
spreads on bonds issued by U.S. corporations in the U.S. bond market and
yield spreads on equally risky corporate bonds issued by the offshore
financing subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations in the $Eurobond market.
Yields are calculated using the issue price before deducting underwriting
costs and al30 using the price after deducting underwriting costs. The
null hypothesis is tested using yield to maturity calculated before under-
writing costs as well as after underwriting cost3. The hypothesis is
tested before deduction of underwriting costs using equation (1).
ITMjj
- Rf = YTMg
- Rf = YS (1)
where,
YTM^ is the yield to maturity of a bond issued by a U.S. corporation in
the U.S. bond market, calculated before deduction of underwriting
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costs.
^r. is the risk free rate
YTM-, is the yield to maturity of an equally risky corporate bond issued by
the offshore financing subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation in the
^Eurobond market, calculated before deduction of underwriting costs.
YS is the yield spread
Equation (2) is used to test the null hypothesis after deduction of under-
writing cost3, with the asterisk, "*", indicating this deduction.
YTM£
- R f = YTMp - Rf = YS* (2)
If the hypothesis is supported both before and after deduction of
underwriting costs, then we can conclude that the U.S. bond market and the
^Eurobond market are well integrated and that effective arbitrage causes
yield differences between markets to be insignificant. Cn the other hand
if the results do not support the hypothesis, this would suggest that tax
effects, liquidity differences, or regulatory barriers exist, or that
investor risk perceptions differ between the two markets.
Another area of interest involves the magnitude of underwriting costs
in the $Eurobond market relative to those in the U.S. market. In each mar-
ket, the investment banker forms a syndicate which helps In marketing the
bonds. The spread or underwriting commission directly affects the cost to
the issuer and indirectly influences the return to the investor. The sec-
ond hypothesis is that the underwriting costs are the same in each market.
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Section II Data and Methodology
An initial sample of over 500 newly issued $Eurobonds (issued by the
offshore financing subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations) was collected
for the 1972-82 period using World Bank [11] data. From the initial sam-
ple, 173 ^Eurobonds were matched with new issues floated by U.S. corpora-
tions in the U.S. market. Matched pairs had the same rating, were issued
at essentially the same time, and had like S.I.C. classifications. In
addition, each matched pair had similar call protection, and maturity. The
matched data set included the following variables for each bond: issuer,
rating, coupon, size of issue, maturity, date of issue, yield to maturity,
underwriting commission and risk free rate on the day of issue. The risk
free rate equals the 3-aonth T-Bill rate as reported in Barron's [1].
For each matched pair, the yield spread was calculated by subtracting
the appropriate risk free rate from the yield to maturity on the day of
issue for both bonds. 5 Yield spreads were then grouped by rating category"
(Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, etc.), and statistical measures of mean and standard
deviation were calculated. Equality of means tests were used to evaluate
whether the mean $Eurobond yield spread was equal to the mean U.S. bond
yield spread, for issues of the same rating category. This evaluation was
performed using equation (3) for each rating category.
YS
E - YSD ± Z l°e
2
+ ad
2
(3)
where
YSg and YSD are the mean yield spreads, before deduction of underwriting
costs, for $Eurobonds and U.S. bonds, respectively.
Z the critical value for the indicated level of confidence.
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a 2
,
a 2 the variance of the $Eurobond and U.S. bond yield spread
distributions, respectively.
For those intervals which do not include the null value of zero, the dif-
ferences in means will be statistically significant at the indicated level
of confidence. Hence, the test results will indicate whether yield spreads
on ^Eurobonds and matched U.S. bonds were significantly different over the
1972-82 period. While Equation (3) refers to yield spreads calculated
before deduction of underwriting costs, the same equality of means approach
was used for testing yield spreads calculated after deduction of underwrit-
ing costs.
The equality of means test was also utilized in comparing underwriting
cost3 for $Eurobond new issues with those for matched U.S. bonds. Using
equation (4), the $Eurobond and matched U.S. bond samples were tested in
their entirety, i.e., not subdivided by rating category.
a 2 + a
C
E - CD ± Z '
e d (4)
where
Cg and Cq equal the mean underwriting costs for $Eurobonds and U.S.
bonds, respectively.
Z is the critical value for the indicated level of confidence.
a 2
,
a, 2 equal the variance of ^Eurobond and U.S. bond underwriting costs,
respectively.
For those intervals which do not include the null value of zero, the
difference in means will be statistically significant at the indicated
level of confidence. The test results will indicate whether underwriting
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costs are statistically greater in one market than in the other.
Section III Empirical Results
A summary of the equality of means testa is reported in Table II,
parts A and 3. The findings are categorized by rating category and matur-
ity. Also shown, are sample size (number of matched pairs), t value, sig-
nificance level, mean $Eurobond yield spread, and mean U.S. bond yield
spread
.
The results in Section A of Table II, using yield spreads calculated
before deduction of underwriting costs, indicate that for eleven out of
twelve rating-maturity categories, $Eurcbond yield spreads were signifi-
cantly less than those of matched U.S. bonds. The only exception was the
6-10 year Aaa category for which $Eurobond and U.S. bond yield spreads were
statistically equal. The findings in Section B of Table II, utilizing
yield spreads calculated after deduction of underwriting costs, are basi-
cally the same as those for yield spreads calculated before deduction of
underwriting costs.''' The best explanation for such significant yield dif-
ferentials is the existence of tax-related barriers. As discussed earlier,
$Eurobonds differ from U.S. corporate bonds in that $Eurobonds are free
from withholding tax at the source and are issued in bearer form. Those
investors seeking to avoid or evade taxes, respectively, are expected to
pay a premium for 3uch tax-related benefits.
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Table II
Summary of t-Tests by Rating and Maturity
A. Yield Spreads Calculated Before Deduction cf Underwriting Costs I
Maturity
Rating
Sample Size
t-value
1-5. years Significance
Mean ^Eurobond Y.S.
Mean U.S. Bond Y.S.
Aaa
13
-2.33
NE
.37
1.65
Aa
9
-1.88
NE
1.22
2.15
16
1.72
NE
1.26
2.08
Less Than .
11
-4.51
NE
1.46
2.81
Sample Size
t value
6-10 years Significance
Mean $Eurobond Y.S.
Mean U.S. Bond Y.S.
23
-.18
EQ
1.18
1.24
20
-2.02
NE
.98
2.08
37
2.13
NE
2.17
3.66
15
•2.27
NE
1.37
2.76
Sample Size
t-value
11-15 years Significance
Mean $Eurobond Y.S.
Mean U.S. Bond Y.S.
8
-1.81
NE
.54
1.50
8
2.84
NE
.71
1.81
7
2.45
NE
.95
2.03
6
-2.72
NE
1.18
2.61
NE = Not equal, i.e., $Eurobond yield spread minus U.S. bond yield spread
difference falls outside the 90% confidence interval.
EQ = Equal, i.e., yield spread difference falls within the 90 % confidence
interval.
Y.S. = Yield spread calculated before deduction of underwriting costs.
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3. Yield Spreads Calculated After Deduction of Underwriting Co3ts
Rating Aaa Aa Less Than A
Maturity
Sample Size
t-value
1-5 years Significance
7
-2.27
NE
7
1.83
NE
9 ;
1.69
NE Sample Size
Too Small
Mean ^Eurobond Y.S.* 1.01
Mean U.S. Bond Y.S.* 1.72
1.42
2.25
1.37
2.14
Sample Size
t value
16
-.04
18
2.00
23
•2.21
6-10 years Significance EQ NE NE Sample Size
Too Small
Mean ^Eurobond Y.S.* 1.23
Mean U.S. Bond Y.S.* 1.25
1.01
2.09
2.19
3-70
Sample Size
t-value
8
-1.81
8
•2.84
7
•2.45
6
-2.72
11-15 years Significance
Mean $Eurobond Y.S.*
Mean U.S. Bond Y.S.*
NE
.54
1.50
NE
.71
1.81
NE
.95
2.03
NE
1.18
2.61
NE = Not equal, i.e., ^Eurobond yield spread minus U.S. bond yield spread
difference falls out3ide the 90>» confidence interval.
EQ = Equal, i.e., yield spread difference falls within the 90£ confidence
interval.
Y.S.* = Yield spread calculated after deduction of underwriting costs.
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The yield spread data was al3o useful in analyzing how (Eurobond and
U.S. bond risk premiums were affected by increasing levels of default risk.
In this connection, the graphs shown in Figure 1 depict yield spread rela-
tionships, prior to deduction of underwriting costs, for both $Eurobond3
and U.S. bends by rating category. An evaluation of yield spreads by rat-
ing level reveals that U.S. bond investors required a substantial increase
in yield for accepting greater default risk. In contrast, ?Eurobcnd inves-
tors demanded only a relatively modest, at times imperceptable, increase in
yield for accepting the same incremental default risk. If rating is used
as a proxy for default risk, $Eurobond investors appear far less sensitive
to increases in default risk than U.S. bond investors. Alternatively,
$Eurobond investors may be equally sensitive to increases in default risk
but may measure it differently than U.S. bond investors. As mentioned ear-
lier, relatively few Eurobond issues are rated and investors are thought
C3> 5 3 to depend on a borrower's general, as opposed to financial, reputa-
tion. Hence, observed differences in the responsiveness of $Eurobond and
U.S. bond investors to changes in default risk may be caused by markedly
different approaches to measuring default risk.
The equality of means test for differences in $Eurobond and U.S. bond
underwriting cost3 indicated that underwriting spreads were not the same in
both markets. The average underwriting spread for $Eurobonds was 1.7% and
the average underwriting spread for matched U.S. issues was .32* with the
difference falling outside the 99% confidence interval. Hence, during the
sample period, bond flotation costs in the U.S. market were significantly
less than those in the $Eurobond market. This result is probably due to
differences in issuing technique. $Eurobonds are placed throughout the
1/
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world by multinational syndicates of underwriting banks, while U.S. bonds
are underwritten and distributed to institutional and individual investors
predominantly in the U.S. market.
Section IV - Conclusions
The findings indicate that $Eurobond yield spreads are significantly
less than yield spreads on comparable bonds issued in the U.S. market.
This result holds both before and after adjusting for flotation costs.
Investors appear willing to pay a substantial price premium for $Eurobonds
relative to U.S. bonds of similar risk. Hence, equally risky securities,
denominated in the same currency, have been shown to trade at different
prices in competing markets.
Of the arguments that can be made for such differential pricing; the
tax argument is the most persuasive. Characteristics, such as absence of
withholding tax at the source and issuance in bearer form, increase the
relative value of $Eurobonds for those who wish to avoid or evade taxes.
In addition, a substantial portion of all Eurobond investment is thought to
be made anonymously by individual investors through Swiss Bank accounts.
For a non-resident tax evader, $Eurobonds present advantages similar to
those provided by tax-free municipal bonds in the U.S. Just as municipal
bond investors accept lower yields than those available on taxable bonds of
equal risk, non-resident tax evaders may accept lower yields on effectively
"tax free" $Eurobonds.
In comparing the responsiveness of $Eurobond and U.S. bond investors
to changes in default risk, U.S. bond investors were found to require a
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substantial increase in yield for accepting greater default risk.
Alternatively, $Eurobond investors demanded only a relatively modest
increase in yield for accepting the same incremental default risk. This
result supports the contention that $Eurobond investors may evaluate
default risk differently than U.S. investors.
The evidence suggests that for taxpaying individuals and corporations
$Eurobonds would have been an inferior investment over the study period
because significantly greater yields (for the same risk) were available in
the U.S. domestic corporate bond market. Yet, from the perspective of a
corporate borrower, $Eurobonds could have been issued at significantly
lower yields (after deduction of underwriting costs) and would have been a
superior source of funds.
On balance, this study has been a first attempt at identifying and
explaining differences in $Eurobond and U.S. bond yield spreads. The find-
ings are consistent with the belief that there are barriers which segment
the two markets, frustrating or at least delaying arbitrage attempts and
preventing equality between rates.
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FOOTNOTES
Each $Eurobond examined in this study was issued by the offshore financ-
ing subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation and was denominated in U.S.
dollars.
2
Congress is currently (1934) considering the repeal of the 30* withhold-
ing tax. If the tax is repealed, a major tax-related barrier would be
eliminated. Clearly, future repeal of the withholding tax will have no
effect on our results for the period of interest, 1974 to 1982.
3 For some foreigners, tax evasion i3 a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition for purchasing ^Eurobonds. Their primary motive is to avoid the
insecurity of investing funds in politically unstable regions (Latin
America, for example). Wealthy investors residing in such politically
unstable environments and desiring anonymity have long been known (unof-
ficially) to deposit their funds, i.e., "flight capital", in Swiss banks
for investment in $Eurobonds among other investments [7].
4
Beginning in March 1982, the SEC began allowing companies to file one
initial registration statement, a "shelf registration." The initial
shelf registration gives a company the freedom to issue securities at any
time within the ensuing two years. After the initial "shelf registra-
tion," the securities specified in the registration can be issued quickly
with only minimal paperwork. This speed and flexibility stands in marked
contrast to the long delays and "red tape" that were characteristic of
the pre-March 1982 registration requirements. By late 1982 it was esti-
mated that 20 percent of the funds raised in the U.S. since March 1982
involved shelf registrations. (Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1982,
page 42.)
5 It should be noted that interest on $Eurobonds is typically paid annually
while semiannual payments are the norm for U.S. bond issues. The yield
to maturity utilized in calculating yield spread is an effective annual
rate, hence yield differences attributable to frequency of interest pay-
ment have been eliminated.
5
Very few ^Eurobond issues have been rated by Moody's or Standard and
Poor's and none of the ^Eurobonds used in this study were rated. How-
ever, $Eurobonds issued by the offshore financing subsidiary of a U.S.
parent corporation are thought to bear the same level of default risk as
similar issues floated domestically [5]. Hence, the "rating" assigned by
the authors to each ^Eurobond represents the U.S. parent corporation's
rating on similar domestic debt outstanding as of the date of the
$Eurobond issue.
The sample size was reduced due to the lack of underwriting cost data for
a subset of our $Eurobond group.
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Appendix A
Criteria Used for Matching:
1. Each member of a matched pair had the same Moody's rating.
2. Members of a matched pair were issued within + 2 weeks of one another.
To verify that market, conditions remained reasonably constant between
the two issue dates, the yields on bond indices of the same maturity
were examined for each date. The bond index yields on each issue date
were required to be within + 25 basis points of one another.
3. Matched pairs were divided into one of three groups by maturity, 1-5
years, 6-10 years or 11-15 years. The following matching criteria were
used within each maturity group:
1-5 years members of a matched pair were required to mature within
+ 1 year of one another.
6-10 years
11-15 years
members of a matched pair were required to mature within
+ 1 1/2 years of one another.
members of a matched pair were required to mature within
+ 2 years of one another.
4. Callability
$Eurobonds were consistently callable sooner than U.S. corporate
bonds of the same maturity and rating, with the period of call protec-
tion averaging approximately 4 years for $Eurobonds and approximately 6
years for their U.S. corporate bond matches. Hence, while the period
of call protection was similar, it was consistently shorter for
$Euro bonds.
The shorter the period of call protection, the higher the expected
yield demanded, ceteris paribus. Hence, based on period of call pro-
tection alone, $Eurobonds would be expected to exhibit marginally
larger yield spreads than U.S. corporate bonds. As will be shown, our
results show significantly smaller yield spreads for $Eurobonds than
for matched U.S. corporate bonds.

